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The legal framework of an economy is often thought of as deﬁning the rules of the game
that economic agents play. However, what really matters for the incentives of these agents
is the strength of the “rule of law”. While precise deﬁnitions of this term are hard to come
by, they usually involve the notion of an economy’s degree of property rights protection,
the enforceability of contracts, the likelihood of crime and violence, and the eﬀectiveness of
an economy’s judiciary (see, e.g., Kaufmann et al., 2007; Weil, 2009, p.346). The rule of
law cannot be taken for granted in most parts of the world. Nobel laureate Douglas North
even concluded that the inability of countries to develop eﬀective, low-cost enforcement of
contracts is the most important cause of the historical stagnation and the contemporary
underdevelopment of today’s low-income countries (North, 1990, p. 54).
The focus of the present paper is on the link between property rights protection, the
incentives to engage in innovation investments, and endogenous economic growth. On the
positive side, we want to know under what conditions a growth policy of public property
rights protection may be eﬀective. On the normative side, we ask whether better public
enforcement of property rights is desirable and discuss the circumstances under which the
government should intervene and hire public employees to protect property rights. To
ﬁx ideas, one may think of public employment as policemen, tax inspectors, lawyers and
judges, prison guards or administrators that all help to enforce property rights.
We address these questions in an endogenous growth framework where growth is the result
of an expanding set of product varieties in the sense of Grossman and Helpman (1991).
The degree of property rights protection is parameterized by the fraction of proﬁts in
the intermediate-good sector that is appropriated by its owners. It endogenously depends
on the share of public employment in the total workforce. Weaker property rights deter
innovation investments and reduce economic growth. Thus, our framework is consistent
with the empirical literature that establishes a positive relationship between the strength
of property rights and economic growth (see, e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1995; Barro, 1996;
Clague et al., 1999; Aron, 2000, provides a comprehensive survey of the empirical litera-
ture). It is also in line with recent empirical support for a positive link between property
rights protection and entrepreneurship (Estrin et al., 2009).
2Our main results can be summarized as follows. We ﬁrst show that a unique dynamic
general equilibrium exists. Whether an economy in its steady state experiences strictly
positive growth rates or not depends on its economic environment and the eﬀectiveness
of public employment in the enforcement of property rights. However, even if public
protection of property rights triggers positive growth rates, this may not be optimal from
a welfare point of view. Indeed, we characterize environments where no growth can be
better than some growth. In these cases the level of public employment that assures
positive growth requires too much reallocation of labor from manufacturing and research
to the public sector. The social costs of public enforcement of property rights then outweigh
the social beneﬁts from positive growth. This result illustrates that public employment
may be too ineﬀective to solve the problem of property rights protection. It suggests
that public enforcement of property rights may itself be a “white elephant” in the sense of
Robinson and Torvik (2005), i.e., a public project with negative social surplus.
Our paper relates and contributes to at least two diﬀerent strands of the literature linking
property rights enforcement to economic growth.
First, it makes a contribution to the literature on predation and economic growth starting
with Grossman and Kim (1996) and Tornell (1997). Papers that, similarly to ours, focus
on public enforcement of property rights include Economides et al. (2007), Zak (2002),
and Dincer and Ellis (2005). These studies explicitly model individuals’ decision how to
allocate their resources to productive and expropriative activities. Individuals have access
to an expropriation technology that, among others, depends on governmental activity.
Moreover, its speciﬁc design determines how many and what type of equilibria exist. In
contrast to these papers, we do not model this decision of individuals. Rather, we assume
that under imperfect property rights resources are diverted from the production to the
household sector. Moreover, the strength of property rights is directly a function of public
employment in the enforcement of property rights. Hence, the focus of our analysis is on
the solution of the problem of property rights protection rather than on the conditions that
may cause weak property rights. An advantage of this approach is that the equilibrium
we identify is unique and allows for clear-cut predictions. Moreover, coordination failure
is not an issue.
3Our result that positive growth can lead to lower social welfare than stagnation if public
enforcement is suﬃciently ineﬀective complements the ﬁndings of Gonzalez (2007). This
author shows that increased private enforcement of property rights and faster growth can
be Pareto-dominated by an allocation with lower growth and less private enforcement.
Similarly, Gonzalez and Neary (2008) show that, in the absence of public enforcement,
(second-best) optimal ﬁscal policy may call for a reduction in growth in order to mitigate
the diversion of resources associated with private enforcement. Intuitively, one may have
thought that public enforcement can, at least in the absence of corruption, solve the prob-
lem associated with private enforcement. However, our result suggests that this does not
have to be the case.
Second, we contribute to the literature that studies the relationship between intellectual
property rights (IPR), i.e., the danger of imitation and the erosion of monopoly power,
growth, and welfare in the framework of the variety expansion growth model. Related
studies include Kwan and Lai (2003) and Furukawa (2007). They analyze the social beneﬁts
and costs of IPR protection assuming that the government can choose the degree of IPR
protection at no cost.1 By contrast, this paper focuses on the role of property rights over
proﬁts. In our model the strength of property rights determines the share of monopoly
proﬁts that is appropriated by its owners. Moreover, we argue that the enforcement of
property rights through governments is endogenous and costly. Accordingly, the optimal
degree of law enforcement equilibrates the advantage of better incentives and faster growth
to the disadvantage of foregone consumption due to the reallocation of labor into public
employment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the details of
the model. In Section 3, we derive the dynamic general equilibrium and establish the
Pareto-optimal allocation as a benchmark. Our main results appear in Section 4. First, we
determine the conditions under which the possibility of public growth-enhancing policies
exists. Second, we characterize the second-best optimal share of public employment in the
enforcement of property rights. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
The latter also contains the details on the calibrations underlying Figures 1 to 3.
1See, e.g., Eicher and García-Peñalosa (2008) for an analysis of the role of private investments in the
endogenous degree of IPR protection and their impact on economic growth.
42 The Model
We consider a closed economy with four sectors and a government. Households work,
consume, and save. The ﬁnal-good sector produces a consumption good out of a variety
of existing intermediate goods. The intermediate-good sector consists of monopolistically
competitive ﬁrms that manufacture one intermediate good using labor as the only input.
The blueprint for the production of each intermediate good is invented in a research sector.
Property rights in the intermediate-good sector are imperfectly protected in the sense that
only a certain fraction of proﬁts can be appropriated by their owners. This may be due
to, e.g., illegal conduct of competitors or expropriation by a criminal organization. In any
case, these actions generate “laundered” income that increases consumption and savings of
the household sector. The degree of property rights protection endogenously depends on
government activity. Speciﬁcally, the government can use tax resources to hire a fraction
of the workforce as public enforcers of property rights.
The Household Sector
There is a continuum of identical households of mass 1. We study their behavior through
the lens of a single representative household that supplies the time-invariant aggregate
labor endowment L inelastically to the intermediate-good, the research and the public





where c(t) is consumption at date t and  > 0 the subjective discount rate. Henceforth,
we suppress time arguments whenever this does not cause confusion. At each t, household
net income comprises labor income, wL, returns on assets, r
, and laundered income, M,
less taxes, T. The household’s ﬂow budget constraint is then given by
_ 
 = wL + r
 + M   T   pcc; with 
(0) > 0: (2)
Here, w denotes the wage rate at t, r the rate of return on assets, and pc the price of the
consumption good. The budget constraint (2) captures the fact that in a closed economy
total laundered income is used for consumption or saving of the household sector.
5The household’s maximization of (1) is subject to (2) and a No-Ponzi condition. Following
Grossman and Helpman (1991), we choose consumption expenditure as the numéraire, i.e.,






The ﬁnal-good ﬁrms produce the consumption good c out of a variety of exiting interme-









where A 2 R++ is the “number” of available intermediate goods at t and x(j), j 2 [0;A]
denotes the quantity of intermediate-good input j used at t. The parameter  2 (0;1)
determines the elasticity of substitution between any pair of intermediates,   1=(1   ).
Following Ethier (1982), the term in front of the integral introduces  > 0 as a measure
of the gains from specialization. As  increases, these gains become more pronounced, for
 ! 0 they vanish.
The representative producer of c is competitive and chooses fx(j)g
A
j=0 to maximize pcc  
R A
0 p(j)x(j)dj at all t, where p(j) is the price of input j.
The Intermediate-Good Sector
Each intermediate-good ﬁrm j 2 [0;A] produces a single intermediate good in a monopolis-
tically competitive environment with demand x(j) = cp(j) =P, where P  [A( 1)(1 )
R A
0 p(j0)1 dj0]=( 1). The production function for all varieties is x(j) = l(j), where l(j) is
the amount of labor hired by ﬁrm j. The price p(j) charged by intermediate-good ﬁrm j
maximizes his proﬁts (j) = q [p(j)   w]cp(j) =P. Here, q 2 [0;1] denotes the strength
of property rights protection. The weaker the degree of property rights protection, i.e., the
lower q, the lower are net proﬁts of intermediate-good producers. Intermediate-good pro-
ducers regard q as a given constant. The resulting monopoly price satisﬁes p(j) = p = w=
such that x(j) = x = cA

1  1 and (j) =  = q(1   )px.
6The Research Sector
Previous to the marketing of an intermediate good it is invented by competitive research
ﬁrms. The production function of the research sector for new intermediates is
_ A = ALA=a; (4)
where LA is the aggregate amount of labor used for research and a is a productivity
parameter. Once a new variety is invented, it is sold by auction to the highest bidder
who also receives a perpetual patent. Accordingly, the price for such a patent at t is
v(t) =
R 1
t (s)e (s t)ds. The proﬁt-maximization problem of the representative research





with \ = ”; if _ A > 0: (5)
Government Activity and Property Rights
The government levies a lump-sum tax T and uses these receipts to hire a fraction  2 [0;1]
of the total workforce as public workers, LP. Their task is to help enforce property rights.
Under a balanced government budget we have for all t
T = wLP = wL: (6)
We stipulate that the degree of property rights protection, q, depends on the share of
public employment in the total workforce,  = LP=L, according to
q = F () with F : [0;1] ! [0;1]: (7)
Here, F is C2 with F(0) = 0, F(1) = 1, F0 > 0 > F00, and lim
!0
F0 = 1. This reduced form
relationship captures the idea that the government via increased spending relative to the
size of the economy can strengthen property rights, though at a declining rate. Naturally,
public employment is bounded by the aggregate labor force. Without public employment
in the enforcement of property rights ﬁrms loose all proﬁts. If the government hired the
7total labor force as public enforcers, property rights in the intermediate-good sector would
be fully secured. Moreover, the function F fulﬁlls an Inada-type condition, reﬂecting the
idea that the productivity of public employees in generating higher degree of property
rights protection is very high for low levels of . Note also that q is a ﬂow variable, i.e.,
the enforcement level of property rights has to be maintained constantly.
3 Equilibrium and Welfare
In this section we derive the dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) for a given  and compare
it to the Pareto-optimal allocation. The ﬁndings of this section provide the groundwork
for the policy analysis that follows.
3.1 Equilibrium
Given , the DGE consists of an allocation fc(t);
(t);M(t);x(j;t);l(j;t);Lx(t);LA(t);
LP(t);A(t)gt=1
t=0 and a price system fr(t);pc(t);w(t);p(j;t);v(j;t)gt=1
t=0 such that house-
holds, ﬁnal-good, intermediate-good and research ﬁrms behave optimally at all t, the gov-
ernment has a balanced budget, the degree of property rights enforcement is given by (7),
there is full employment of labor, i.e., at all t, Lx(t)+LA(t)+LP(t) = L, and the capital
market values ﬁrms according to fundamentals and 
(t) = A(t)v(t).
The following proposition establishes the existence of a unique steady-state equilibrium
with and without growth.








(1   )(1   )F()L   a
a[F()(1   ) + ]

: (8)
The economy immediately jumps to the unique steady state for any admissible set of initial
conditions.
According to Proposition 1, public employment in the enforcement of property rights aﬀects
the consumption growth rate g
c in three ways. On the one hand, a higher  reduces the
8labor force available for research and intermediate-good production as reﬂected by the term
(1   )L. Through this channel, a higher  reduces g
c. The remaining two channels aﬀect
the equilibrium value of ﬁrms, 
 = F()(1   )=(gA() + ), where gA is the growth rate
of A. The equilibrium value of ﬁrms increases in  because of better property rights. This
eﬀect is mitigated since better property rights also increase the growth rate of A.
Finally, the steady-state growth rate is determined by the parameters ;a;;, and L that
characterize the economic environment. Quite intuitively, for g





















Hence, the economic environment is more prone to research and growth the smaller a, ,
and  and the greater  and L. Intuitively, the smaller a, the greater is the productivity
in the research sector and the greater is the research output. The smaller the discount
rate, , the greater is the incentive to save and to acquire equity shares issued by research
ﬁrms. The lower the degree of substitutability of intermediate goods, , the greater are the
monopoly proﬁts in the intermediate-good sector. With stronger gains from specialization,
i.e., with a higher , consumption growth is faster. Finally, the higher the aggregate labor
endowment, L, the more labor can be allocated to research, manufacturing and public
employment.
Observe that g












if  = 0 and q = F() = 1 could hold simultaneously. This is the result established for
an economy where property rights are fully secured without government intervention as
envisaged by Grossman and Helpman (1991). Intuitively, a meaningful trade-oﬀ between
better property rights protection and its costs can only arise if gc > 0 in the world of
Grossman and Helpman. Therefore, for the remainder of our analysis we assume this to
be the case:
Assumption 1 It holds that a=[(1   )L] < 1 ) gc > 0.
With this assumption it is straightforward to show that gc > g
c for all admissible parameter
9values. Thus, in a world where property rights need protection the equilibrium growth rate
is always smaller.
3.2 The Pareto-Optimal Allocation (First-best)
To derive the Pareto-optimal growth rate, we consider a social planner who allocates the
factors of production and outputs to households and ﬁrms. Naturally, this allocation is
independent of the degree of property rights protection.
Due to the decreasing marginal product of the intermediate goods in the production of the
ﬁnal good, the social planner chooses a symmetric conﬁguration c = A=( 1)Lx at all t.
The inter-temporal optimization determines the allocation of labor between manufacturing
and research. Formally, the planner maximizes U of (1), invoking full employment and the
production function of the research sector. This problem has previously been solved by
Bénassy (1998) and de Groot and Nahuis (1998). In our notation their result appears in
the following proposition.










Comparing the Pareto-optimal rate (11) to the equilibrium growth rate under secure prop-
erty rights (10) it holds that
gP
c R gc ,  R
a
(1   )(L + a)
2 (0;1): (12)
Proposition 2 shows that the Pareto-eﬃcient growth rate may be smaller than the equilib-
rium growth rate if the gains from specialization are suﬃciently small. Since the problem in
less developed and transition economies seems to be that there is ineﬃciently low growth,
we shall from now on focus on the case where gP
c > gc.2
2Recall that gc > g





c for any admissible . Thus,




c may hold for some .
104 Optimal Government Policy (Second-Best)
This section establishes the optimal level of public employment that the government should
hire to protect property rights. The government maximizes the welfare of the representative
household attainable in the equilibrium of Proposition 1. It is in this sense that the optimal
policy is second-best. Moreover, we establish that the second-best growth rate of the
economy is strictly smaller than the growth-maximizing one. To address these issues, it is
necessary to enquire ﬁrst into the possibility of growth-enhancing policies.
4.1 Government Policy and Steady-State Growth
The ﬁrst statement of the following proposition characterizes the conditions under which
government investment in the enforcement of property rights may trigger positive growth
rates. For this case, the second statement establishes the growth-maximizing government
policy.
Proposition 3 (Policy and Growth)
1. If ^  = argmax
2[0;1]
(1   )F() is such that (1   ^ )F(^ )  a=[(1   )L], then g
c = 0
for all  2 [0;1].
2. If (1 ^ )F(^ ) > a=[(1 )L], then there is (min;max) with 0 < min < max < 1
such that g
c > 0 for all  2 (min;max). In this case, there is a unique  2
(min;max) that maximizes g
c.
Roughly speaking, Proposition 3 states that public employment may increase the equi-
librium growth rate if its eﬀectiveness in the production of property rights protection as
represented by the function F is suﬃciently strong for the economic environment. Intu-
itively, the product (1 )F() represents the two opposing eﬀects of  on g
c that appear
in the numerator of (8). Since F(0) = 0, F0() is (very) large for small values of  and
F(1) = 1, this product has some global maximum on (0;1). The value of this maximum
will crucially depend on F. For instance, if F() = , 0 <  < 1, then F() < 0. There-
fore, 1= may serve as a measure of the eﬀectiveness of the public sector. Accordingly,
(1   ^ )F(^ ) increases with this measure.
11According to Statement 1 of Proposition 3, the steady-state growth rate is zero if the
economic environment is not suﬃciently favorable to growth and/or public employment is
not suﬃciently eﬀective. However, government intervention may trigger positive growth.
Then, according to Statement 2 of Proposition 3 a growth-maximizing share of government
activity, , exists. It balances at the margin the two opposing eﬀects of government activity
mentioned above.
4.2 Optimal Property Rights Protection
To derive the welfare-maximizing policy, we ﬁrst solve the integral of (1) using c(t) = c0 eg
ct











Here c0 denotes the initial level of consumption at t = 0. Using the equilibrium conditions
c = A=( 1)Ax and Lx = Ax we obtain c0, for a given initial quantity of intermediates A0
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[F()(1 )+] if  2 [min;max]:
(14)
Observe that the expressions of the latter equation are valid in the circumstances described
3To derive c0 for  2 [min;max] consider that in this case Lx = =w, where the steady-state wage
rate is determined by condition (5), which has to hold with equality in a steady state with positive R&D
activity, i.e., w = vA=a. Moreover, the aggregate value of equities, 
 = vA, is constant in the steady state.












one ﬁnds that vA = F()(1 )=(g

A +) and thus w = [F()(1   ) + ]=((1 )L+a). Note, that the
former also implies that the initial value A0 > 0 determines v (0) such that 
0 = F()(1   )=(g

A + ).
12in Statement 2 of Proposition 3.4 In this case, the welfare function is given by
U() =
8
> > > > > <







0 (1   )L
i













2 if  2 [min;max]:
(15)
As c0, also U is piecewise-deﬁned in regimes with and without growth. However, one
readily veriﬁes that U is continuous for all  2 [0;1].
Figure 1: Welfare function with a global maximum at  2 (0;1).
To develop an understanding of the value of  that maximizes U on [0;1], the following
remarks prove useful.
First, if the government chooses  2 [0;min] [ [max;1], then there is no research. Hence,
Lx = (1 )L, and g
c = 0. Accordingly, in these intervals a rise in  reduces consumption
in all periods by reducing the labor force available for production and welfare declines
monotonically in  (see, e.g., Figure 1).
Second, for levels of  2 [min;max], there is research and growth. Therefore, a rise in 
has a level eﬀect on current consumption and a growth eﬀect. The level eﬀect is due to the
reallocation of labor from manufacturing to research and public employment. The sign of
the growth eﬀect depends on the level of  with respect to its growth-maximizing value .
4If Statement 1 of Proposition 3 applies, then c0 = A
=( 1)
0 (1   )L and g

c = 0 for all . As will
become clear below, in this case welfare would decline monotonically in  such that the welfare maximum
is attained at  = 0. In what follows we shall neglect this case.
13Close to min the growth eﬀect increases g
c. If the positive growth eﬀect of a higher share
of public employment outweighs the negative eﬀects on the level of initial consumption
near min, then the welfare function is inversely U-shaped on [min;max]. Otherwise, U
continues to decline in . Examples for the ﬁrst case are given in Figures 1 and 3. The
second case is depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Monotonically declining welfare function.
The following proposition sharpens this intuition and fully characterizes the optimal share
of public employment.
Proposition 4 (Policy and Welfare ) Suppose Statement 2 of Proposition 3 holds.
1. If dU=dj=min > 0, then there exists argmax
2[min;max]
U =  2 (min;max). If addi-
tionally U() > U(0), then  maximizes U on [0;1]. If U() < U(0), then  = 0
maximizes U on [0;1]. If dU=dj=min  0, then  = 0 maximizes U on [0;1].5
2. It holds that  < .
Statement 1 of Proposition 4 shows that in terms of welfare no growth can be better
than some growth. The two possible scenarios are depicted in Figures 2 and 3. In these
economic environments the level of public employment that guarantees positive growth
rates requires a substantial reallocation of the labor force away from manufacturing and
5In the non-generic case where U(0) = U(
), the solution of max
2[0;1]
U is not unique.
14research towards the public sector. Therefore, the negative static welfare eﬀect of public
employment outweighs the welfare beneﬁts from growth. As shown in Figure 2, this may
occur at the margin min such that dU=dj=min  0. Figure 3 depicts the case where
dU=dj=min > 0 with a local maximum at  and U() < U(0).
This result suggests that public employment may be insuﬃciently eﬀective to solve the
problem of property rights protection.6 Our result that positive growth can lead to lower
social welfare than stagnation conﬁrms the ﬁndings of Gonzalez (2007) and Gonzalez and
Neary (2008) in an environment where the enforcement of property rights is not a private
matter.
Figure 3: Welfare function with a local maximum at  2 (0;1).
Statement 2 of Proposition 4 implies that even if the welfare-maximizing public employment
share is positive, it always falls short of the growth-maximizing one, i.e.,  < . To








. The second term, i.e., the
consumption growth rate is maximized at . By contrast, the ﬁrst term (which corresponds
to the static welfare eﬀect) negatively depends on  because a rise in  reduces the resources
available for ﬁnal-good production. Thus, the public employment share that maximizes U
has to be smaller than the one that maximizes g
c.
6It’s worth noting that Proposition 4 holds independent of whether g
P
c  gc or not. In the examples
depicted in Figures 1, 2 and 3 it holds that g
P
c > gc > g

c, i.e., there is ineﬃciently low growth in
equilibrium.
155 Concluding Remarks
We have studied the interdependence between property rights, optimal public enforcement,
innovation, and endogenous economic growth in an economy where growth results from an
expanding set of product varieties. The strength of property rights enforcement determines
the proﬁt that ﬁrms expect from an innovation investment. It is determined by governments
hiring a fraction of the labor force. Our results may be summarized as follows.
On the positive side, we identity the conditions under which a government is able to
assure strictly positive equilibrium growth through public enforcement of property rights.
This is the case if the economic environment is suﬃciently prone to growth and/or public
employment is suﬃciently eﬀective.
On the normative side, we determine the optimal enforcement policy of a government able
to protect property rights and to generate growth through public employment. We ﬁnd
that in terms of welfare, implementing an equilibrium path with no property rights pro-
tection and no growth may be preferable to one with some positive degree of property
rights protection and strictly positive growth. The former equilibrium path is optimal if
the welfare costs of the reallocation of labor away from manufacturing and research to-
wards public employment are too high. The latter solution arises only if the economic
environment is suﬃciently favorable to growth and public employment is suﬃciently ef-
fective. The government may then choose an optimal level of public enforcement that
allows for strictly positive growth. However, the optimal policy always involves imperfect
enforcement of property rights and the implemented growth rate is strictly smaller than
the highest possible growth rate.
16Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
We start the derivation of the steady-state growth rate by looking at the labor market.7
The linear production function of intermediates implies for a symmetric conﬁguration that
the aggregate labor demand of this sector is Lx = Ax. Moreover, constant returns to
scale in the production of the ﬁnal consumption good and our normalization imply 1 =
Apx. Thus, Lx = =w. Aggregate labor demand in the research sector obtains from the
production function of research as LA = agA, where gA  _ A=A. Hence, the labor market
equilibrium condition (1   )L = Lx + LA holds if and only if gA = (1   )L=a   =(wa).
When employment in research is positive, we need v = wa=A (see equation 5). Hence,
a necessary condition for positive steady-state growth of A is v  a=(AL). Deﬁning
V  









For the capital market to be in equilibrium, the return that a shareholder can expect must
be equal to the return of a riskless loan. As the former is the sum of dividends and capital
gains and the latter is equal to , we obtain as a no-arbitrage condition  = ( + _ v)=v,
where instantaneous net proﬁts with 1 = Apx are  = q(1   )=A. Then, observing that
_ V =V =  gA   _ v=v, we have
_ V
V
=  gA    + q(1   )V: (17)
Equations (16) and (17) jointly describe the equilibrium paths of V and gA. Setting _ V = 0
in (17) and substituting V =
gA+
q(1 ) and q = F() in (16) delivers the unique equilibrium





(1   )(1   )F()L   a
a[F()(1   ) + ]

: (18)
7This proof extends the one of Grossman and Helpman (1991, p. 57-62) to an environment with  6= 1
and imperfect property rights.
17For any symmetric conﬁguration it holds that c = A=( 1)Lx. Hence, _ c=c = gA=( 1)+
_ Lx=Lx. As LA and Lx have to be constant in the steady state, g
c is also unique and given
by (8).
To demonstrate that there are no transitional dynamics we show that starting the economy
outside of the steady state leads either to V ! 1; gA = 0 or V ! 0; gA ! L=a > 0. Both
cases violate rational expectations.
Consider the ﬁrst case. As V  1=(Av) ! 1 it must be that v ! 0 since A cannot decline.










i.e., without innovations the monopoly proﬁts and their present value remain positive. We
arrive at a contradiction to v ! 0:















or V > =[q(1   )] which contradicts V ! 0: 
Proof of Proposition 2
See Bénassy (1998) or de Groot and Nahuis (1998).
Proof of Proposition 3
The equilibrium growth rate (8) is equal to zero if




Deﬁne the left-hand side of (19) as LHS(). LHS() is greater or equal than zero for
all  2 [0;1] with LHS(0) = LHS(1) = 0. Moreover, @LHS=@ =  F + (1   )F0 is
positive for values of  close to zero and negative for values of  close to one. Finally,
18@2LHS=@2 < 0. Thus, there exists a unique ^  2 (0;1) such that @LHS=@ = 0. If
^  = argmax[(1   )F()] is such that (1   ^ )F(^ )  a=[(1   )L], then g
c = 0 for any
. This proves Statement 1.
For g
c to become positive in (18) the government has to set  such that




If ^  = argmax[(1   )F()] is such that (1   ^ )F(^ ) > a=[(1   )L], then there exist
min and max with 0 < min < max < 1 such that (1 min)F(min) = a=[(1 )L] =
(1   max)F(max). Then, for all  2 (min;max) it holds that g
c > 0. This proves the
ﬁrst part of Statement 2. Moreover, for all  2 (min;max), g
c takes strictly positive
values. Tedious, but straightforward manipulations reveal that @2g
c=@2 < 0 such that
g
c has a unique maximum. Denote  = argmax
2(min;max)
g
c. This proves the second part of
Statement 2. 
Proof of Proposition 4
We proof each statement of the Proposition separately, starting with Statement 1.
1. On the intervals [0;min] and [max;1], U is a monotonically declining and strictly
concave function in . Moreover, U(0) > U(max). Thus, on the interval [0;min] [
[max;1] U has its global maximum at  = 0.
On the interval [min;max], it holds for all  >  that @g
c=@ < 0 such that U
unambiguously declines in . However at min, increasing  has two opposing eﬀects
on U. A higher  negatively impinges on welfare by lowering initial consumption c0
and positively aﬀects welfare by allowing for a higher consumption growth rate g
c.
If the latter eﬀect dominates the former, then (dU=d)j=min > 0. Moreover, U is a
continuous function and U(max) < U(min). Thus, if (dU=d)j=min > 0 holds, then
there exists an interior maximum of U in [min;max]. Denote  = argmax
2[min;max]
U.























F0 (min)[(1   min)L + a]   LF (min)[F(min)(1   ) + ]




(1   min)L + a
+
F0 ()(1   )
[F(min)(1   ) + ]
: (21)














(1   )(1   min)L
:(22)
The term in square brackets on the left-hand side of (22) is positive because State-
ment 2 of Proposition 3 holds. Moreover, the right-hand side of (22) is equal to
F(min), and therefore strictly smaller than 1. Thus, (22) is easily met, e.g., for
suﬃciently large values of .
For  to maximize U on the whole interval [0;1], we need in addition that U() >
U(0), i.e.,
(1   )(1   )F ()L   a
a[F ()(1   ) + ]
  ln[F ()(1   ) + ] > ln

L
((1   )L + a)

:
Figure 1 depicts this case.
If (dU=d)j=min > 0 and U() < U(0), then  = 0 is the global maximizer of U.
This case is illustrated in Figure 3.
If condition (22) does not hold, then U is a monotonically declining function in [0;1]
and is maximized at  = 0 (see Figure 2 for an example).








. The second term is maximized
at  > 0: Moreover, @ lnc0=@ < 0 for any . Thus, the welfare-maximizing share
has to be strictly smaller than the growth-maximizing one, i.e.,  < .

20Calibrations underlying Figures 1 - 3
All ﬁgures were produced with Mathematica. The notebooks are available upon request.
The parameter values were not chosen to represent a particular economy but rather to
construct cases that underline the main points of the paper. Clearly, all calibrations satisfy
Assumption 1. Moreover, it holds that gP
c > gc, i.e., in equilibrium growth is ineﬃciently
low.
All ﬁgures specify F() = . The parameters of Figure 1 are  = 3=4, A0 = 2, L = 20,
a = 3,  = 1=5;  = 40,  = 5=6. The parameters of Figure 2 are  = 3=4, A0 = 2, L = 20,
a = 3,  = 1=5;  = :5,  = 5=6. The parameters of Figure 3 are  = 3=4, A0 = 2, L = 5,
a = 1,  = 1=5;  = 3,  = 5=6.
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